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Abstract
We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field
games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time,
over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of a mean field
equilibrium assuming continuity of the cost and of the drift. These conditions are
more general than the existing papers studying finite state space mean field games.
Besides, we also study the convergence of the equilibria of N -player games to mean
field equilibria in our four settings. On the one hand, we define a class of strategies
in which any sequence of equilibria of the finite games converges weakly to a mean
field equilibrium when the number of players goes to infinity. On the other hand,
we exhibit equilibria outside this class that do not converge to mean field equilibria
and for which the value of the game does not converge. In discrete time this non-
convergence phenomenon implies that the Folk theorem does not scale to the mean
field limit.
1. Introduction
Mean field games have been introduced by Lasry and Lions [34] as well as Huang,
Caines and Malhame´ [30] to model interactions between a large number of strategic
agents (players) and have had a large success ever since. Since the seminal work in
[32, 33, 34, 30], a large variety of papers have been investigating mean field games.
Most of the literature concerns continuous state spaces and describes a mean field
game as a coupling between a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with a Fokker-
Planck equation (see for example [28, 7, 9, 24, 10, 25, 22, 23, 3]). Here, we are
interested in studying mean field games with a finite number of states and finite
number of actions per player. In this case, the analog of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation is the Bellman equation and the discrete version of the Fokker-
Planck equation is the Kolmogorov equation.
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Finite state space mean field games in discrete time (a.k.a. with synchronous
players) were previously studied in [20]. In their work, the strategy of the players is
the probability matrix of the Kolmogorov equation. This implies that each player
can choose her dynamics independently of the state of the others: the behavior
of players is only coupled via their costs. In that case, the Kolmogorov equation
becomes linear.
Finite state space mean field games in continuous time (a.k.a. with asynchronous
players) have also been previously analyzed in [21, 27, 5, 13]. In their model, the
players also control completely the transition rate matrix so that the dynamics are
again linear once the actions of the players are given. Again, players do not interact
with each other directly in these models, but only through their costs.
The models we study here, both in the synchronous and asynchronous cases
cover non-linear dynamics: We consider that the players do not have the power to
choose the rate matrix and that their actions only have a limited effect on their
state. Here, the transition rate matrix may depend not only on the actions taken by
the player, but also on the population distribution of the system. This introduces
an explicit interaction between the players (and not just through their costs). This
non-linear dynamics is called the relaxed case in [14]. We claim that the model with
explicit interactions covers several natural phenomena such as information/infection
propagation or resource congestion where the cost but also the state dynamics of a
player depend on the state of the all the others. This type of behavior is classical in
systems with a large number of interacting objects [6] and cannot be handled using
previous mean field game models. For instance, in the classical SIR (Susceptible,
Infected, Recovered) infection model [39], the rate of infection of one individual
depends on the proportion of individuals already infected. Similarly, in a model of
congestion one player cannot typically use a resource if it is already used to full
capacity.
We show that the only requirement needed to guarantee the existence of a Mean
Field Equilibrium in mixed strategies is that the cost is continuous with respect
to the population distribution (convexity is not needed). This result nicely mimics
the conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium in the simpler case of static
population games (see [36]). The existence of a mean field equilibrium in mixed
strategies has been previously shown by [31, 12] in the diffusion case. In [27] the
existence of a Mean Field Equilibrium is proven under the assumption that the cost
of a player is strictly convex w.r.t. her strategy and in [21] the authors also consider
uniformly convex functions. These conditions are rather strong because they are
not satisfied in the important case of linear and/or expected costs. In [14] existence
of a Nash equilibrium is also proved under mere continuity assumptions and with
a compact action space (more general than the simplex, used here). However, the
main difference between the two approaches is the type of mean field limit that is
used. In [14], the trajectories of the states of the players are considered while we
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only consider the state at time t. The first approach uses arguments in line with
the propagation of chaos while the second one is closer to the work in [4, 38]. While
the convergence of trajectories is a more refined convergence than the point-wise
convergence in general, this is useless here. Indeed, for mean field games, costs are
associated to states and actions and not to trajectories. Therefore, the point-wise
mean field approach is sufficient. Another difference with [14] is that an additional
assumption about the uniqueness of the argmin is needed in some parts of the
convergence proof as well as for existence (in the feedback case). This is not the
case here, so both papers do not cover the exact same set of games.
As in most existence proofs, our proof is based on a version of the fixed point
theorem of Kakutani in infinite dimension (see for example [13] where such an ex-
tended version of the fixed point theorem is used in a mean field game model with
minor and major players). Here however, we do not consider the best response
operator but the evolution of the population distribution instead, as in [14]. Out
of the four cases (asynchronous/synchronous, finite/infinite horizons), we mainly
detail the asynchronous player case for which we prove this existence of a mean field
equilibrium in an infinite horizon with discounted costs. We also show, more briefly,
how these results can be extended to a finite horizon or to a finite or infinite time
horizon in the synchronous-player case.
Our second contribution concerns convergence of finite games to mean field lim-
its. Different authors have studied the convergence of N -player games equilibria to
mean field equilibria, e.g. [29, 1, 37, 38]. The type of strategies considered in these
paper is different from ours: they consider that the strategy of a player only de-
pends on her internal state (these are called stationary policies in [38]), whereas here
we allow time dependence in these policies. The model in [38] does include state
dynamics that depend on the population distribution but only considers station-
ary strategies that do not depend on time, hence cannot depend on the population
dynamics.
In all four combinations (finite / infinite horizon, synchronous / asynchronous),
a mean field equilibrium is always an ǫ-approximation of an equilibrium of a corre-
sponding game with a finite number N of players, where ǫ goes to 0 when N goes
to infinity. This is the discrete pending result to similar results in continuous games
[11]. However, we show also that not all equilibria for the finite version converge to
a Nash equilibrium of the mean field limit of the game. We provide several counter-
examples to illustrate this fact. They are all based on the following idea: The “tit
for tat” principle allows one to define many equilibria in repeated games with N
players. However, when the number of players is infinite, the deviation of a single
player is not visible by the population that cannot punish him in retaliation for
her deviation. This implies that while the games with N players may have many
equilibria, as stated by the folk theorem, this may not be the case for the limit
game. This fact is well-known for large repeated games (see examples of Anti-folk
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Theorems in [35, 2]). However, up to our knowledge, these results have not yet been
investigated in the mean field game framework. 1
Finally, our four models of dynamic games do not face the issue of the order of
play, nor partial information. Thus, we avoid two difficulties of dynamic games: the
information structure of each player and the existence of a value [15]. In our case,
all players are similar, so the order of play is irrelevant, and we only consider the
full information case: players know the strategy of the other players and the current
global state (more details on this are given in Section 3.2).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We introduce mean field games
with explicit interactions in continuous time in Section 2 where we mainly focus on
the infinite horizon with discounted costs. We describe the evolution of the state of
the players, the cost function as well as the best response operator. In both cases
(finite and infinite horizon), we prove the existence of an equilibrium. We show in
Section 3 that this equilibrium is an approximation of an equilibrium for the game
with a finite number of players. Finally, we study an example of an N -player game
inspired from the prisoner’s dilemma whose equilibria are not always equilibria for
the limit mean field game. We focus on the synchronous case in Section 5 (where
players all play at the same time). In this case, N -player games can be seen as
classical stochastic games in discrete time. We derive the mean field limit dynamics
and the existence of an equilibrium. Here counter-examples of equilibria for finite
games that do not go to the limit are easier to find. Indeed, the folk theorem applies
and all equilibria based on retaliation cannot be equilibria at the limit.
2. Discrete Mean Field Games in Continuous Time
2.1. Notations and Definitions
A discrete mean field game G is a tuple G = (E ,A, {Qa},m0, {ca}, β), where E is
the state space, A the action set, {Qa} the transition rate matrices, m0 the initial
state, {ca} the cost functions and β ∈ R a discount factor.
The game is described as follows.
State and action sets. We consider a population made of an infinite number of
homogeneous players that evolve in continuous time. Each player has a finite state
space denoted by E = {1, . . . , E} and a finite action set A = {1, . . . , A}.
We denote by P(A) (resp. P(E)) the set of probability measures over A (resp.
E). Since A is finite, P(A) is the simplex of dimension A.
1An extended abstract discussing our counterexample in the continuous time model with infinite
horizon was presented in [16].
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Set of strategies. A mixed strategy (or strategy for short) is a measurable function
π : E × R+ → P(A), that associates to each state i ∈ E and each time t ≥ 0 a
probability measure πi(t) ∈ P(A) on the set of possible actions. We also denote by
πi,a(t) the probability that, at time t, a player in state i takes the action a, under
strategy π. For all t ≥ 0 and all i ∈ E , we have
∑
a∈A πi,a(t) = 1. The set of all
possible strategies is denoted by S.
We say that a strategy is pure if, for all state i and all t ∈ R, there exists an
action a ∈ A such that πi,a(t) = 1 and πi,a′(t) = 0 for all a
′ 6= a.
The set S is a bounded subset of the Hilbert space of the functions E × R+ →
R
A equipped with the inner product the exponentially weighted inner product :
〈f, g〉 =
∫∞
0 f(g)g(t)e
−βtdt. This shows that S is weakly compact, where the weak
topology is defined as follows: a sequence of policy πn converges to a policy π if for
any bounded function g:
lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
0
πn(t)g(t)e−βtdt =
∫ ∞
0
π(t)g(t)e−βtdt. (1)
Rate matrices. We denote by mpi(t) ∈ P(E) the population distribution at time t.
As the state space is finite, mpi(t) is a vector whose i-th component, mpii (t), is the
proportion of players in state i at time t. The evolution over time of the population
distribution is driven by rate matrices: {Qa(m
pi(t))}a∈A. By definition, Qija(m
pi(t))
is the rate at which a player in state i moves to state j when choosing action a, when
the population distribution is m(t). Note that by definition,
∑
j∈E Qija(m
pi(t)) = 0
for all i and a and Qija(m
pi(t)) is non-negative for all j 6= i and all a.
In the following, we assume that for all i, j, a, Qija(m) is Lipschitz-continuous
in m with constant L.
The initial condition is mpi(0) = m0. For t ≥ 0, the population distribution
mpi(t) is the solution of the following differential equation, that depends on the
strategy π: for j ∈ E
m˙pij (t) =
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
mpii (t)Qija(m
pi(t))πi,a(t). (2)
The rationale behind this differential equation is that all players in state i use the
action a ∈ A and move to state j with rate Qija(m
pi(t)).
If the strategy πi(t) is not continuous in time, the differential equation (2) may
not be well-posed at time-points where πi is not continuous. The existence of a
continuous solution for (2) is guaranteed by the Carathe´odory’s Existence Theorem.
The Lipschitz condition on Q further implies that this solution is essentially unique
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because any solution of (2) must be a fixed point of
mpij (t) = mj,0 +
∫ t
0
(∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
mpii (u)Qija(m
pi(u))πi,a(u)
)
du. (3)
In anticipation, the same properties (existence and uniqueness of the solution of
the ODE) hold for the differential equation (4).
Remark 1 (Explicit interactions). In this model, the rate matrix Qija(m
pi(t)) de-
pends explicitly on the population distribution: the rate to go from state i to state j
under action a depends on how the whole population is distributed among the states
of the system. Other mean field models, such as [20], only consider the special case
where Qija(m
pi(t)) is constant: Qija(m
pi(t)) = Qija. This restricts the population
dynamics given in (2) to linear dynamics.
Cost function. We now concentrate on a particular player, that we call Player 0.
Player 0 chooses her own strategy π0 : R+×E → P(A). We denote by xpi
0
(t) ∈ P(E)
the probability distribution of Player 0 when Player 0 uses strategy π0 against a
population who has distribution m. For a given state i ∈ E , xpi
0,m
i (t) denotes the
probability for Player 0 to be in state i at time t. The distribution xpi
0,m evolves
over time according to the following differential equation: for j ∈ E
x˙pi
0,m
j (t) =
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
xpi
0
i (t)Qija(m(t))π
0
i,a(t). (4)
If Player 0 is in state i and takes an action a, it suffers from an instantaneous cost
ci,a(m(t)), that depends on the population distribution at time t. We assume that
the cost is always continuous in m. Given a population distribution m and the
strategy of Player 0 π0, we define the discounted cost of Player 0 as
W (π0,m) =
∫ ∞
0
(∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
xpi
0,m
i (t)ci,a(m(t))π
0
i,a(t)e
−βt
)
dt, (5)
where β > 0 is the discount factor.
We also introduce the notation V (π0, π) that represents the discounted cost of
Player 0 when the population plays a strategy π:
V (π0, π) =W (π0,mpi).
Best response. The best response to π of Player 0 is to choose a strategy π0 ∈ S
that minimizes her discounted cost (5) when the rest of the population plays strategy
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π. For a given population strategy π, we denote the set of best responses of Player 0
to π by BR(π). This set is the set of strategies that minimizes her discounted cost:
BR(π) := argmin
pi0∈S
V (π0, π). (6)
Note that the best response function is well defined or, in other words, that the
“argmin” is reached for some strategy in Equation (6). To prove that, we will later
prove in Section 2.3 that the function V is continuous for the weak topology. As S
is weakly compact, this shows that the minimum in π0 is attained.
Proposition 1. The function V , defined in Equation (5) is continuous in π0 and
π (for the weak-topology on S).
Mean field equilibrium. We then define a mean field equilibrium as a strategy
πMFE such that when the population strategy is πMFE, a selfish Player 0 would
also choose the same strategy πMFE as her best response.
Definition 1 (Mean Field Equilibrium). A strategy π is called a mean field equilib-
rium if it is a fixed point for the best response function, i.e.,
πMFE ∈ BR(πMFE). (7)
A mean field equilibrium is pure if it is a pure strategy.
The rationale behind this definition is when one considers that the population is
formed by players that each take selfish decisions. As the population is homogeneous,
each player best response is the same as Player 0. In other words, for a given
population strategy π, all the rational players of the populations (or players) choose
the strategy BR(π). As in classical games, a mean field equilibrium is a situation
where no player has incentive to deviate unilaterally from the common strategy.
2.2. Existence of Mean Field Equilibrium
We now show that, under very general assumptions, all discrete mean field games
admit a mean field equilibrium. As for classical games, these equilibria are not nec-
essarily pure. As most proof on existence of equilibria, our proof relies on a gener-
alization of Kakutani fixed point theorem to infinite dimensional spaces. However,
the classical approach consisting of showing that the best response function BR(π)
is a Kakutani map does not work here when the cost function is not strictly convex.
Therefore, in our approach we focus on the state of the game instead of the best
response function.
As mentioned before, the differential equations (2), (4) and the cost equation
(5) are all well defined under our running Assumption (A1):
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(A1) The rate function m 7→ Qija(m) is Lipschitz-continuous in m. The cost func-
tion m 7→ ci,a(m) is continuous in m.
In particular, this assumption implies that the costs and the rates are all bounded
by a finite value.
Theorem 1. Any discrete mean field game G whose rate and cost satisfy Assump-
tion (A1) admits a mean field equilibrium.
Note that in general, the best response function π 7→ BR(π) is neither continuous
nor hemi-continuous in general under (A1). In particular, the best response set
BR(π) may not be a convex set. This makes difficult the application of the classical
fixed point theorems on the best response function. As a result, our proof will
formulate the fixed point problem in an alternative manner by considering a fixed
point in m.
2.3. Proofs
2.3.1. Proof of Proposition 1
For a strategy π, the functionmpi satisfies the differential equation (2). Asmpi(t)
lives in a compact and the functions Q are continuous, the right-hand side of this
differential equation is bounded. This shows that there exists a constant L′ such
that for any strategy π, the function mpi is Lipschitz-continuous with constant L′.
Similarly the function xpi
0
is also Lipschitz-continuous with constant L′.
Let M be the set of functions from R+ to P(E) that are Lipschitz-continuous
with constant L′. We equip this set with the exponentially weighted L∞-norm :∥∥m−m′∥∥ = sup
i∈E,t≥0
∣∣mi(t)−m′i(t)∣∣ e−βt.
By the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, M is a compact space.
To prove that V is continuous in π and π0, it suffices to show that the mapping
π 7→ mpi is continuous (for the weak topology) and that the mapping (π0,m) 7→
xpi
0,m is continuous. To prove the continuity of mpi, let πn be a sequence of strategy
that converges to a strategy π. As M is compact, there exists a function m and a
subsequence of mpin that converges to m. Moreover, we have :
mj(t) = mj,0 + lim
n→∞
∫ t
0
(∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
mpini (u)Qija(m
pin(u))(πn)i,a(u)
)
du (8)
= mj,0 +
∫ t
0
(∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
mi(u)Qija(m(u))πi,a(u)
)
du, (9)
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where the convergence holds because πn converges weakly to π and m
pin converges
uniformly on all compact to m.
Equation (9) shows that the functionm is equal to the functionmpi. This shows
that π →mpi is continuous in π which implies that V is continuous in π.
The proof that (π0,m) 7→ xpi
0,m is continuous is very similar to the above proof
and we therefore omit it.
2.3.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that for a given population distribution m ∈ M, the cost of a strategy
π0 is defined as
W (π0,m) =
∫ ∞
0

∑
i,a
xi(t)π
0
i,a(t)ci,a(m(t))e
−βt

 dt, (10)
where x satisfies (for all j ∈ E): x˙j(t) =
∑
i,a
xi(t)Qija(m(t))π
0
i,a(t).
(11)
We now define the function Φ : M→ 2M as the best response to a population
distributionm. It is a mapping that associates to a population distributionm ∈ M,
the set of all state distributions that can be induced by an optimal policy:
Φ(m) =
{
xpi
0
such that π0 ∈ argmin
pi∈S
W (π,m)
}
. (12)
In the remainder of the proof, for all m ∈ M, Φ(m) is well defined and non
empty (i.e., the minimum is attained), is convex and compact. Moreover, we will
also show that the function Φ(·) is upper-semicontinuous. As M is compact [8,
Prop. 11.11], this shows that Φ(·) satisfies the conditions of the fixed point theorem
given in [26, Theorem 8.6] and therefore has a fixed point m∗. By the definition of
Φ, this implies that there exists a strategy π0 that is a best-response to mpi
0
, which
implies that π0 is a mean field equilibrium.
Definition of Φ(m) – It can be shown that W is continuous (by using a rea-
soning similar to the one for V (Proposition 1)). This shows that there exists π0
that attains the minimum on the right hand side of Equation (12), which shows that
Φ(m) is well defined and non-empty.
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Compactness of Φ(m) – Let us consider the following optimization problem:
min
x,z
∫ ∞
0

∑
i,a
zi,a(t)ci,a(m(t))e
−βt

 dt (13)
such that z satisfies


∑
a zj,a(t) = xj(t) ∀j ∈ E ,
zj,a(t) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ E ,∀a ∈ A,
x˙j(t) =
∑
i,a zi,a(t)Qija(m(t)) ∀j ∈ E .
(14)
The above problem is a linear problem, which implies that the set of optimal solu-
tions is convex and compact. Let us show that the set of optimal solution of the
optimization problem (13) is Φ(m). To show this, let us remark that the constraints
(11) are equivalent to the constraints (14) by replacing the variables xi(t)π
0
i,a(t) by
zi,a(t). Then, the constraint π ∈ S of (11), that corresponds to π
0(t) ∈ P(A), is
replaced with zi,a(t) ≥ 0 and
∑
a zi,a(t) = xi(t).
Upper-semi continuity of Φ. To prove that Φ is upper-semi continuous, let
us show that the graph of m 7→ Φ(m) is closed. Let mn ∈ M and xn ∈ Φ(mn)
be two sequences such that limn→∞mn = m∞ and limn→∞ xn = x∞. We want to
show that x∞ ∈ Φ(m∞).
AsW is continuous, for all xn ∈ Φ(mn), there exists a strategy πn that minimizes
W (π,mn) and such that xn = x
pin,mn . As the set S is weakly compact, this sequence
of strategies has a subsequence that converges weakly to a strategy π∗. Moreover,
we have:
• As W is continuous, π∗ minimizes W (π,m∞). This shows that x
pi∗ ∈ Φ(m∞).
• The solution of (11) is continuous in π andm, which shows that x∞ = x
pi∗,m∞ .
Combining these two facts shows that x∞ ∈ Φ(m∞) which implies that the graph
of Φ is closed.
Remark 2. The continuity assumption (A1) is tight in the following sense:
1- If the rate Q is not Lipschitz-continuous in m, then the evolution of the
population is not well defined, in the sense that the evolution equation (2) may have
several solutions or no solution at all.
2- There exist games with non-continuous cost functions that do not admit any
mean field equilibrium. For example, consider the following mean field game:
G =
(
E = {1, 2},A = {a, b}, Qa = 0, Qb =
[
−1 1
0 0
]
,m(0) = (1, 0) (15)
ca(m1,m2) = 0, cb(m1,m2) =
{
−1 if m2 ≤ 1/2
1 otherwise
, β
)
. (16)
10
Assume that this game has a mean field equilibrium and let denote by m(t) the state
at equilibrium. By definition of Qa and Qb, m2(t) is a non-decreasing function.
Hence, let τ = sup{t : m2(t) ≤ 1/2} (note that τ ∈ [ln 2;+∞) ∪ {+∞}). It should
be clear that the best response of Player 0 to any state function m is the policy π(τ)
that consists in playing “b” until τ and “a” after τ . However, such a policy is never
a mean field equilibrium: under the policy π(τ), m2(t) = 1− e
−min(t,τ), which means
that sup{t : m2(t) ≤ 1/2} ∈ {ln 2,+∞}. None of the policies π
(ln 2) or π(∞) is an
equilibrium: the policy π(ln 2) is the best response to π(∞) and vice-versa.
3. Convergence of Finite Games to Mean Field Games
Mean field games are often presented as a limit of a sequence of finite games as
the number N of players goes to infinity. In this section, we investigate positive and
negative results that link finite games and mean field games.
3.1. Markov Game with N Exchangeable Players
To any discrete mean field game G = (E ,A, {Qa},m0, {ca}, β), one can associate
a stochastic N -player game GN = (N, E ,A, {Qa},m0, {ca}, β) as follows. The finite
stochastic game GN has the same state and action spaces E ,A, the same rate matri-
ces Qa, the same cost functions ca, the same discount factor β, and the same initial
state as G. The time evolution of the finite game is as follows. At any time t, each
player (say Player n) chooses a (randomized) action An(t) ∈ P(A).
We consider a mean field interaction model between the players, which means
that the behavior of one object only depends on the states of the other objects
through the proportion of objects that are in a given state. To be more precise, we
denote by M(t) ∈ P(E) the population distribution of the system at time t. As the
set E is finite, M(t) is a vector with |E| components and for all i ∈ E , Mi(t) is the
fraction of players that have state i at time t:
Mi(t) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1{Xn(t)=i}.
The state of one player (say Player n) follows a continuous time Markov chain
whose rate varies over time. The only dependence between players is through the
rate that depends on the population distribution.
More precisely, the evolution of the state of Player n, under Ft, the natural
filtration of the process, satisfies for all k ∈ N and all states i 6= j,
P (Xn(t+ dt) = j|Xn(t) = i,M(t) =m, An(t) = a,Ft) = Qija(m)dt+ o(dt), (17)
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where An(t) is the action taken by Player n at time t.
At any time t, Player n suffers an instantaneous cost that is a function of her
state Xn(t), the action that she takes An(t) and the population distribution M(t).
We write this instantaneous cost cXn(t),An(t)(M(t)).
The objective of Player n is to choose a strategy πn from some set of admissible
strategies Π, in order to minimize her expected discounted cost, knowing the strate-
gies of the others. As before, the discount factor is denoted by β. Given a strategy
πn ∈ Π used by Player n and a strategy π ∈ Π used by all the others, we denote by
V N (πn, π) the expected discounted cost of Player n:
V N (πn, π) = E
[∫
e−βtcXn(t),An(t)(M
pi(t))dt
∣∣∣∣∣ An is chosen w.r.t. π
n
An′ is chosen w.r.t. π (∀n
′ 6= n)
]
.
A Nash equilibrium for this game is a strategy π such that Player n does not
have another admissible strategy that leads to a lower cost. This notion depends
naturally on the set of admissible strategies.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium of the N player game). For a given set of strategies Π,
a strategy π ∈ Π is called a symmetric equilibrium in Π if for any strategy πn ∈ Π:
V N (π, π) ≤ V N (πn, π).
We will also use the notion of ε-equilibrium:
Definition 3 (ε-equilibrium of the N player game). For a given set of strategies
Π, a strategy π ∈ Π is called an ε- symmetric equilibrium in Π if for any strategy
πn ∈ Π:
V N (π, π) ≤ V N (πn, π) + ε.
3.2. Subsets of Admissible Strategies
In a full information setting, An(t) is a (possibly random) function of the values
Xn′(t
′) up to time t′ ≤ t and all actions taken in the past An′(t
′), for t′ < t and
for n′ ∈ {1 . . . N}. Such a strategy is, however, hard to analyze. Therefore, in the
following, we will consider two natural subclasses for the set of admissible strategies,
depending on the information available to the players:
• (Markov) – A strategy π is called a Markov strategy if it induces a choice of
An(t) that is a (possibly random) measurable function of only t, M(t) and
X(t):
P (An(t) = a | Ft) = πa,Xn(t)(t,M(t)).
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This definition is motivated by the fact that, as indicated by Equation (17),
the behavior of one object depends on the others only through the valueM(t).
This implies that when all the other players use a Markov strategy, the set
of Markov strategies is dominant among the set of full-information strategies:
there exists a full-information best response for Player n that is a Markov
strategy. Furthermore, any Markov game admits a Markovian Nash equilib-
rium (see [17]).
• (Local) – A strategy π is a local strategy if the choice of the action only depends
on the player’s internal state and on the time.
P (An(t) = a | Ft) = πa,Xn(t)(t).
If a player uses a local strategy, its actions may depend on time, hence may
track the law of the population M(t) (but not M(t) itself). Also notice that a
local strategy is not necessarily stationary because of its dependence on time.
3.3. Nash Equilibria Limits
The next theorem provides a relation between local equilibria of finite games
and mean field equilibria of the limit mean field game. In particular, it shows that
mean field equilibria are a good approximation of local equilibria. However, as we
will show later, this result does not hold for Markovian equilibria.
Theorem 2. Consider a finite stochastic game GN , with N players and assume that
(A1) holds for its rate matrices Qa and its cost functions ca. Then:
(i) Let π be a mean field equilibrium of the associated mean field game G. There
exists N0 such that for all N ≥ N0, π is a local ε-equilibrium of the N player
game.
(ii) Let (πN )N∈N be a sequence of local strategies such that π
N is an εN -equilibrium
for the N player game, with εN → 0. Then any sub-sequence of the sequence
(πN ) has a sub-sequence that converges weakly to a mean field equilibrium of
G.
Proof. First, V N (πn, π) converges to V (πn, π) uniformly in (πn, π). Uniform con-
vergence follows from Theorem 3.3.2 in [38] (The theorem is stated for stationary
strategies, but local strategies as defined here are equivalent to stationary strategies,
as defined in [38]).
Thus, for any ε, there exists N0 such that N ≥ N0 implies that∣∣V N (πn, π)− V (πn, π)∣∣ ≤ ε/2. Hence, if π is a mean field equilibrium, this implies
that for any local strategy πn:
V N (π, π) ≤ V (π, π) +
ε
2
≤ V (πn, π) +
ε
2
≤ V N (πn, π) + ε.
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This shows (i).
For (ii), if πN is a sequence of local strategies, then any sub-sequence has a sub-
sequence that converge weakly to some local strategy π∞. As V (πn, π) is continuous
in πn and π (for the weak topology), this implies that V (π∞, π∞) ≤ V (πn, π∞) for
all local strategy πn.
3.4. Markov Equilibria May Not Converge to Mean Field Equilibria
We now show that Theorem 2-(ii) does not generalize to Markov strategies. the
following example was first presented in [16]. The main ingredient used to construct
the following counterexample, is the “tit-for-tat” principle. This principle can be
used to construct equilibria for any N -player game but cannot be used in mean
field games. This approach has been used in repeated game papers (see for example
the examples in [35], further generalized [2]). Up to our knowledege, this type of
behavior has not yet been described in the mean field game framework.
Let us consider a mean field version of the classical prisoner’s dilemma. The
state space of a player is E = {C,D} (that stand for Cooperate and Defect) and the
action set is the same A = E . At each time step, one player is chosen. If she selects
an action a ∈ A, her state becomes a at the next time step.
The instantaneous cost of a Player n depends on her state i and on the mean
field m:
ci,a(m) =
{
mC + 3mD if i = C
2mD if i = D
At each time step, this cost function corresponds to a matching game where a player
plays against a randomly assigned opponent and suffers a cost that corresponds to
the following matrix:
C D
C 1,1 3,0
D 0,3 2,2
The strategy D dominates the strategy C. This implies that playing D is the
unique mean field equilibrium. Indeed, the expected cost (given by (5)) of a Player 0
that has a state vector x while the mean field is m(t) is∫ ∞
0
[xC(t)(mC(t) + 3mD(t))(π
0
CC(t) + π
0
CD(t)) + xD(t)2mD(t)(π
0
DC(t) + π
0
DD(t))]e
−βtdt
=
∫ ∞
0
[xC(t) + 2mD(t)]e
−βtdt,
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by using the fact that π0CC(t)+π
0
CD(t) = π
0
DC(t)+π
0
DD(t) = 1 and xC(t)+xD(t) =
mC(t) +mD(t) = 1.
It should be clear that this cost is minimized when xC is minimal, which occurs
when the strategy is to choose action D regardless of the current state. This shows
that the only mean field equilibrium is when all players choose action D.
Let us now consider the game with N players and consider the following Markov
strategy:
πN (m) =
{
C if mC = 1
D if mC < 1
and let us show that for β < 1 and N large, πN is a Markov Nash equilibrium.
Assume that all players, except Player n, play the strategy πN and let us compute
the best response of Player n. It should be clear that if at time 0, mC < 1, then the
best response of Player n is to play D. On the other hand, if mC = 1, then:
• If Player n applies πN , she will suffer a cost
∫
exp(−βt)dt = 1/β.
• If Player n deviates from πN and chooses the action D, all players will also
deviate after that time. This implies that mD(t) ≈ 1− exp(−t) and that the
player n will suffer a cost approximately equal to
∫∞
0 (xC(t)+2−2e
−t)e−βtdt ≥
2/(β(β + 1)) when N is large.
When β < 1, then 2/(β(β +1)) > 1/β, so that Player n has no incentive to deviate
from the strategy πN and that therefore, πN is a Nash equilibrium. We also observe
that for this example, the value of the finite game does not converge to the one of
the mean field game.
In conclusion to this section, one can argue that this counter-example should not
be surprising because, in mean field games, punishment is possible against a fraction
on the population that deviates but is not possible against individual deviation,
because it is not seen in the population distribution.
As a final remark, as in the case of repeated games, the continuity with respect
to m (not true here) is critical for convergence (see [35]).
4. Finite Horizon Case
Let us now consider mean field games over a finite time horizon T . These
games are similar to games with discounted costs, previously defined, but they only
run for a finite duration T . As in the discounted case, the evolution over time
of the population distribution mpi is given by (2) and the evolution of Player 0’s
distribution is given by (4).
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Given the population strategy π and Player 0 strategy π0, the expected cost of
Player 0 for the finite horizon case is defined as follows:
V (π0, π) =
∫ T
0
(∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
xi(t)ci,a(m
pi(t))π0i,a(t)
)
dt. (18)
In the literature, similar models have been studied, considering continuous time
finite state space mean field games with finite horizon. The authors in [21] consider
uniformly convex cost functions and in [27] cost functions are assumed to be strictly
convex. In our model, we assume that the costs are continuous in the population
distribution. It can also be observed that the instantaneous cost of Player 0 is linear
in π0. Therefore, the model we study in this work is not covered by these papers.
We define the notion of mean field equilibrium for the finite horizon case as in
the discounted case, by replacing the cost function (5) by (18). Then, the proof of
the existence Theorem 1 applies mutatis mutandis to show the existence of a mean
field equilibrium in this case: Any continuous time mean field game over a finite
horizon that satisfies Assumption (A1) has a mean field equilibrium.
4.1. Convergence to a Mean Field Equilibrium
The construction of a counter example of convergence with an infinite time
horizon given in §3.4 cannot be directly adapted to the finite horizon case. In the
finite-horizon version of the game defined in §3.4, the strategy πN is not a Nash
equilibrium for the N -player game because at the last time-slot, the best response
of Player n to any strategy is to play D. By induction on the number of time-slots,
the only Nash equilibrium of the N -player game is when all players play D, which
coincides with the mean field equilibrium.
Yet, a counter-example also exists for finite-time horizon. The essential idea is
to start with a matrix game with two pure Nash equilibria instead of one as in the
previous example. Let us consider the following cost matrix:
C D P
C 1,1 3,0 4,0
D 0,3 2,2 4,3
P 0,4 3,4 3,3
The setting is similar to the previous example: the action set is equal to the state
state E = A = {C,D,P} and at each time step, one player is chosen. If she selects
an action a ∈ A, then her state becomes a at the next time step. This game can
be viewed as a generalization of the prisoner’s dilemma with an additional Nash-
equilibrium P (which stands for “punish”). It can be shown using a similar path as
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in the previous section that, when T is large enough, the following time-dependent
Markovian2 strategy is a Nash equilibrium:
πN (m, t) =


C if t < 1 and mc = 1;
D if t ≥ 1 and mP = 0;
P otherwise.
(19)
In the above strategy, the state P is used as a stick to punish people from deviating
from the imposed strategy. In this case, nobody has an incentive to deviate from
this strategy at the last step because D is also a Nash equilibrium.
The mean field game has only two equilibria: The whole population always plays
D, or the whole population always plays P . These equilibria are also equilibria for
the finite-game. Yet, they both have a larger cost than the strategy of Equation (19).
This leads us to say that the value of the game does not converge: the asymptotic
cost of the strategy (19) is strictly smaller than the cost of any of the mean field
equilibria.
5. Synchronous Players
As explained in the previous section, mean field games in continuous time appear
naturally as the limit of N -player asynchronous games as N goes to infinity. In these
asynchronous games with N players, only one player changes state at the same time.
However, there are other situations where it is more natural to consider synchronous
games in which, at each time step, all players take an action.
5.1. Synchronous N -Player Games with Exchangeable Players
Here we consider a finite synchronous game GNs = (N, E ,A, {Pa},M0, {ca}, β)
with N identical players with several differences from the model used in Section 3.1,
the main one being the replacement of the rate matrices by stochastic matrices. As
before, each Player n has an internal state Xn(t) that belongs to a finite state space
E (X(t) = (X0(t), . . . ,XN−1(t)) and chooses an action from a finite action space A.
The main difference with the previous asynchronous model is that at each time step
t ∈ Z+, all players choose an action An(t) ∈ A simultaneously. We assume that, a
player in state i who chooses action a goes to state j with probability Pija(X(t))
and that, given X(t), the evolution of all players are independent. Furthermore,
we assume that the players are exchangeable, i.e. for any permutation σ of the N
players, Pija(X0(t), . . . ,XN−1(t)) = Pija(Xσ(0)(t), . . . ,Xσ(N−1)(t)). The fact that
2When the time horizon is finite, it is natural to consider Markovian strategies that depend on
time.
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all players are exchangeable implies that the dependence in X(t) can be replaced by
a dependence on the population distribution M(t). More precisely, for any vector
state x,y ∈ EN and any action vector a ∈ AN , one can write:
P (X(t+ 1) = j|X(t) = i,A(t) = a,Ft) =
N∏
n=1
Pinjnan(M(t)), (20)
where Ft is the natural filtration of the game up to time t, m is the population dis-
tribution of x and ∀i, j ∈ E ,∀a ∈ A, Pija(m) forms a stochastic matrix, continuous
in m.
The instantaneous cost at time t depends on actions and state at time t −
1, symmetric in all players, so it can be written as a function of the population
distribution: cXn(t),An(t)(M(t)), and a discount factor δ at each time step. Given a
strategy π0 used by Player 0 and a strategy π used by all the others, the expected
cost of Player n is:
V N (π0, π) = E
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtcX0(t),A0(t)(M
pi(t))
∣∣∣∣∣ A0 is chosen w.r.t. π
0
An′ is chosen w.r.t. π if n
′ 6= 0
]
.
(21)
5.2. Corresponding Mean field Game
Synchronous games also admit mean field game limits. To construct this limit,
let us consider a strategy π such that πi,a(m) is the probability for a player to
choose action a given that she is in state i and that M(t) =m. Assume that M(0)
converges in probability to some m(0) as N goes to infinity and that all players
except Player 0 apply a strategy π that is continuous in m. As shown in Theorem
1 in [19] (up to differences in notations, the mean field model in [19] is the same as
Equation (20)), the population distribution Mpi(t) converges (in probability) to a
deterministic quantity mpi(t) as N goes to infinity. mpi(t) is defined by
mpij (t+ 1) =
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
mpii (t)Pi,j,a(m
pi(t))πi,a(m(t)). (22)
We denote by π0 the strategy of Player 0. The probability that Player 0 is in state
j ∈ E evolves over time according to the following equation:
xj(t+ 1) =
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
xi(t)Pi,j,a(m
pi(t))π0i,a(m(t)). (23)
In this case, the cost of Player 0, given by (21) becomes
V (π0, π) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
δtxi(t)ci,a(m
pi(t))π0i,a(m(t)).
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As the evolution of m is deterministic, for any closed loop strategy πi,a(m(t))
and any initial condition m(0), there exists an open-loop strategy πi,a(t) that leads
to the same values for mpi(t) and the same cost. Hence, for the mean field model,
one can replace any state-dependent strategy π(m(t)) in the above equations by a
time-dependent strategy π(t).
Player 0 chooses the strategy that minimizes her expected cost. When Player 0
does so, we say it uses the best response to the mass strategy π.
BR(π) = argmin
pi0
V (π0, π).
A strategy is said to be a mean field equilibrium if it is a fixed point for the best
response function, that is,
πMFE ∈ BR(πMFE).
One of the difficulties of the analysis of continuous time mean field game is
that the elements under consideration (the population distribution, the population
strategy, Player 0 strategy...) are continuous functions of time. In the discrete time
case, the model gets significantly simplified since all the elements are vectors. Hence,
the proof of the existence of a mean field equilibrium for continuous-time mean field
game (Theorem 1) can be adapted to show that the following result.
Theorem 3 (Mean Field Equilibrium Existence for Synchronous Games). Any syn-
chronous mean field game with discounted cost that satisfies Assumption (A1) for P
and c respectively, has a mean field equilibrium.
Sketch of proof. We first observe that the set of discrete-time open-loop policies is
a compact and convex set. Thus, to finish the proof, we need to show that the best
response function has a closed graph and it is convex. The former condition is true
since the set of open-loop policies belongs to a finite dimensional space and from
the continuity assumptions (A1). The last condition can be shown using the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1.
5.2.1. An Important Special Case: Repeated Games
The classical repeated games with discounted costs and with identical players
form a subclass of synchronous games, as defined here. To see this, let us first
consider a static N -player matrix game G with symmetric cost: u(a1, . . . , aN ) is the
instantaneous cost of any player when the players use actions a1, . . . , aN respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that u(a1, . . . , aN ) = u(aσ1 , . . . , aσN ), for any permutation
σ of {1, . . . , N}. The players repeat the matrix game infinitely often and their cost
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under strategy π1, · · · , πN is the discounted sum of the costs:
V N (π1, π2, · · · , πN ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtu(π1(t), π2(t), · · · , πN (t)). (24)
These games fit in our framework: The state of a player is merely her current
action (X(t) = A(t)) and the evolution of the state becomes trivial: Under state
x = a and selecting action b, the next state does not depend on the other players
and becomes b with probability one: Pab(b,M(t)) = 1. The cost of one player at
each stage corresponds to an immediate cost cXn(t),An(t)(M(t)) = u(X(t)) since the
cost u only depends on the population distribution by symmetry. As for the total
cost of a player, (24) coincides with (21), as long as all players in the same state use
the same strategy.
5.3. The Folk Theorem Does Not Scale
The relation between equilibria of N -player games with their mean field limits
is also complex in the discrete time case.
Let us first focus on results that concern the performance of mean field equilibria
in the N -player game. The situation is almost similar to the continuous time case
and resembles Theorem 2 (i) in the sense that if π is a mean field equilibrium, then
under assumption (A1), there exists N0 such that for all N ≥ N0, π is a local ε-
equilibrium of the N -player game. The proof of this is essentially similar to the
proof of Theorem 2.
Let us now consider the Nash equilibria of the N -player game. The situation is
very different from the continuous time case because the state of all the players can
change in one time unit in the discrete time while in continuous time, state can only
change in small steps, one player at a time.
This has several consequences on the nature of equilibria under both models.
As mentioned before, the Nash equilibria in the continuous time case may depend
on the initial population distribution, but this is not the case here, so that there is
more latitude for designing equilibria.
Let us consider the particular case of repeated games, introduced in Section
5.2.1. For this type of games, the set of equilibria can be characterized using the
Folk Theorem for repeated games.
Theorem 4 (Folk theorem, adapted from Theorem A in [18])). Let G be a sym-
metric matrix game, and let V ∗ be the cost under the strategy that repeats the Nash
equilibrium of the static game G. Then for any compatible3 cost V smaller than V ∗,
3In this context, a compatible cost is a cost that can be attained by at least one strategy.
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there exists a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) such that V ∗ is the cost of an equilibrium of
the discounted repeated game.
Actually, for any V < V ∗, the construction of an equilibrium whose cost is V
is based on the “tit for tat” principle. We claim that none of these equilibria scale
at the mean field limit. Let us consider the following example for a static game.
Each player only has two strategies, D and C. If all players play D, the cost is
−1. If all players play C, the cost is −2. If some players play D and others play
C, then, all the players who play C get −2MC while the players who play D get
−3MC −MD, where MC and MD are the proportions of players playing C and D
respectively. These costs correspond to the average costs obtained by a player in a
matching game against a random opponent.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the static game is strategy (D,D, . . . ,D). The
cost of the corresponding repeated game is (1− δ)
∑
t−δ
t = −1.
Let us now consider the following strategy (denoted πN in the following) for all
players: Play D for k rounds then play C as long as every-other player has followed
the same pattern, else play D forever. The cost of this strategy is between −1 and
−2:
(1− δ)(
k−1∑
t=0
−δt +
∞∑
t=k
−2δt) = −1− δk.
The strategy πN is an equilibrium of the finite game if δ is large enough. Indeed,
no player wants to deviate in the first k rounds, because her cost would increase:
In the rounds after k, a deviation provides an immediate cost advantage, at the
cost of being punished until the end of time, so that a larger enough δ makes this
non-profitable.
Let us now consider the mean field game setting. If the whole population uses
the strategy πN and if Player 0 uses the same strategy her cost becomes
V (πN , πN ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
δtxi(t)ci,a(m
pi(t)π0i,a(m(t)),
= (1− δ)(
k−1∑
t=0
−δt +
∞∑
t=k
−2δt)
= −1− δk.
However in the mean field setting, the best response of Player 0 to πN is not πN
but the strategy πD where she plays D all the time. Indeed in this case her total
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cost becomes
V (πD, πN ) = (1− δ)(
k−1∑
t=0
−δt +
∞∑
t=k
−3δt)
= −1− 2δk.
This shows that πN is not a mean field equilibrium and a “free rider” player can
take advantage of the fact that the population will not act against her.
5.4. Finite Horizon Case
We now focus on the mean field games when objects evolve in discrete time time
over a finite horizon, 0 to T . In this case, the population distribution mpi is defined
by (22), which depends on the strategy of the mass π. We assume that Player 0 can
choose her own strategy π0. The expected cost of Player 0 is
V (π0, π) =
T∑
t=0
∑
i∈E
∑
a∈A
xi(t)ci,a(m
pi(t))π0i,a(m(t)),
where xi(t) is the probability that Player 0 is in state i at time t. The evolution of
xi(t) over time is described in (23).
Player 0 uses best response to a given population strategy π, which means that
she selects the strategy π0 that minimizes her expected cost. We are interested in
proving the existence of a mean field equilibrium which consists of finding a strategy
that is a fixed-point for the best response function. In Section 5.2, we showed this for
the discounted case. In the finite horizon case, the vectors have finite size and, as a
consequence, it is immediate to show, using the same arguments of those required for
the proof of Theorem 3, that any discrete time mean field game with finite horizon
cost such that P and c satisfy Assumption (A1) has a mean field equilibrium. Again,
the proof mimics the proof of the analog Theorem 1 in continuous time over a finite
horizon.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we generalize the framework of discrete-space mean field games to
the cases of non-convex costs and explicit interactions. They hit a good compromise
between tractability (existence of an equilibria) and modelization power (including
propagation and congestion behaviors). This model consists of a finite state space
mean field game where the transition rates of the objects and the cost function of
a generic object depend not only on the actions taken but also on the population
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distribution. We also show that there exists a sub-class of Nash equilibria for N -
player games that converge to mean field equilibria when the number of players goes
to infinity. Outside of this class, and in particular for all equilibria using the “tit for
tat” principle over which the Folk theorem is based, the convergence does not hold.
For future work, we are interested in finding conditions ensuring the uniqueness
of the mean field equilibrium. We believe that monotony assumptions similar to
assumptions in [21] are required to prove the existence of a unique mean field equi-
librium in this model. On the other hand, another interesting open question concerns
the convergence of N -players equilibria to mean field equilibria when the number
of player grows. We believe that there exist many N -player games for which the
only limiting equilibria are mean field equilibrium, for example when players have
incomplete information about the game. It would be interesting to characterize the
sub-class of strategies where convergence to mean field equilibria holds. Obviously,
this class includes all local strategies (no information) and excludes some Markovian
ones (full information).
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